China stock market: first two weeks of 2016
The first days of trading of Chinese stocks (SSE A Share Index) in 2016 looked like a very serious correction:
A roundup of subsequent commentary:
Eswar Prasad: 5 myths about China’s economy
Wonkblog: How China could trigger a global crisis
China Daily: Multinational firms confident in China's economic prospects: Despite China's cooling economy, the enthusiasm of the world's top 500 firms for setting up new business in the nation shows no signs of abating.
Nikkei: China slowdown a worry for Southeast Asia: "While China's economy continues to grow much faster than those of Japan and most Western countries, according to official figures, the country's mix of slowing imports, wobbly stock markets and a weakening currency is a growing concern for Southeast Asian countries that have grown increasingly dependent on trade with Asia's largest economy."
Wonkblog: What’s really important about China’s stock market disaster, and what’s not
Houze Song: Why Beijing's Economic Caution Is the Risky Approach
corporate governance and moral hazard issues are still rampant in the domestic financial system. As domestic financial institutions continue to expect life support from Beijing when crisis strikes, liberalizing the financial sector alone is unlikely to change the behavior of financial institutions much. ... finance and real-side reform are complementary—one cannot yield substantial benefits without the other. Radical financial reform can’t compensate for lackluster real-side reform. Without more fundamental reform, such as allowing private firms to enter sectors that are currently dominated by the state-owned sector, financial reform will not provide a significant boost to economic growth—and might even cause financial instability. In other words, such reform strategies might backfire, creating even worse problems, instead of soothing China’s economic transition pains.
Paul Krugman, March 2007: The Big Meltdown
The truth is that efforts to pin the stock decline on any particular piece of news are a waste of time.
Wise analysts remember the classic study that Robert Shiller of Yale carried out during the market crash of Oct. 19, 1987. His conclusion? “No news story or rumor appearing on the 19th or over the preceding weekend was responsible.” In 2007, as in 1987, investors rushed for the exits not because of external events, but because they saw other investors doing the same.
What made the market so vulnerable to panic? It wasn’t so much a matter of irrational exuberance — although there was plenty of that, too — as it was a matter of irrational complacency.